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Four cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) that occurred from December 16, 2003, to January
8, 2004, in the city of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province,
China, were investigated. Clinical specimens collected from
these patients were tested by provincial and national labo-
ratories in China as well as members of the World Health
Organization SARS Reference and Verification Laboratory
Network in a collaborative effort to identify and confirm
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection.
Although SARS-CoV was not isolated from any patient,
specimens from three patients were positive for viral RNAby
reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction assay and
all patients had detectable rises in SARS-CoV–specific anti-
bodies. This study shows the effectiveness of a collabora-
tive, multilaboratory response to diagnose SARS. 
I
n November 2002, cases of a highly contagious and
severe atypical pneumonia were identified in
Guangdong Province in southern China (1). By March
2003, the infection had spread to Hong Kong, Singapore,
Vietnam, Taiwan, Canada, and the United States.
Designated severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the
outbreak was subsequently linked to infection with a pre-
viously unrecognized coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (2–4).
The outbreak ended with the World Health Organization
(WHO) announcement on July 5, 2003, that the last patient
had recovered and the human chain of SARS transmission
was broken (5). In all, 29 countries reported to WHO
>8,000 SARS cases with 774 deaths (6). 
Since WHO’s declaration of the end of the SARS epi-
demic, 17 cases of laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV
infection have been reported. Infections in 13 patients
were associated with laboratories: 6 exposed while work-
ing in the laboratory and 7 contacts of a patient with a
laboratory-acquired case (7–9). The other four cases were
acquired in the community. On December 26, the Chinese
Ministry of Health informed WHO of the first case of
community-acquired SARS in Guangzhou, the capital city
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by reports of three additional cases, all linked to a region
in Guangzhou (10). Although none of these cases was fatal
or resulted in documented secondary transmission, they
demonstrate that community-acquired infection with
SARS-CoV, and potential reemergence of SARS leading to
epidemic spread, remains a possibility. These cases also
highlight some issues associated with diagnosing and con-
firming the diagnosis of SARS-CoV infection. In this
report we describe the laboratory diagnosis and associated
confirmation of SARS-CoV infection for these four cases.
Materials and Methods
Patients and Specimens
From December 16, 2003, to January 8, 2004, four
SARS cases were identified in Guangzhou, Guangdong
Province, China. Patient 1 was a 32-year-old male televi-
sion producer in whom fever and headache developed on
December 16, 2003. Patient 2 was a 20-year-old female
waitress who became ill on December 26. Patient 3 was a
35-year-old male businessman in whom fever developed
on December 30. Patient 4 was a 40-year-old male hospi-
tal director and practicing physician who became ill on
January 8, 2004. All patients had temperatures >38°C and
x-ray evidence of pneumonia. A confirmed case of SARS
is defined as clinically compatible illness with laboratory-
confirmed evidence of SARS-CoV infection. Initial tests
by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of
Guangdong Province and the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention of Guangzhou (laboratory A; laboratories
that participated in this study are listed in Table 1) were
positive for SARS-CoV, which prompted a systematic col-
lection of clinical specimens, including respiratory secre-
tions, urine, stool, and serum collected at different time
points in patients’illnesses. Confirmatory testing was per-
formed by the Institute for Viral Disease Control and
Prevention and Institute for Communicable Infection
Disease, China Center for Disease Control (laboratory B)
and members of the WHO SARS Reference and
Verification Laboratory Network (11), including the
Government Virus Unit and Department of Microbiology,
Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (laboratory C), and the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (laboratory D).  
Serologic Tests
SARS-CoV Microneutralization Assay
Serum specimens were tested by laboratories B, C, and
D for neutralizing antibodies to SARS-CoV by microneu-
tralization assay using the procedure of Sui et al. (12) but
with different virus strains (laboratory D, Urbani strain;
laboratory B, P9 and P11; laboratory C, strain 6109 or
HKU-39846). Briefly, serial dilutions were prepared and
added in triplicate to 96-well plates (Costar, Corning, NY).
Approximately 75 PFU of SARS-CoV was added to the
diluted serum samples and incubated at 37°C for 45 min.
Vero E6 cells (2 x 105/mL)were added to the wells, and the
mixture was incubated at 37°C for 3 to 4 days. Results
were visualized by staining the wells with a crystal vio-
let–formaldehyde staining reagent (0.013% crystal violet,
2.5% ethanol, and 10% formaldehyde in 0.01 mol/L phos-
phate-buffered saline [PBS]) for 1 h at room temperature.
The neutralization titer was measured as the reciprocal of
the highest serum dilution that completely inhibited Vero
E6 cell lysis in at least two of the three triplicate wells.
SARS-CoV Enzyme Immunoassay
Laboratories A, B, and C performed serologic testing
for SARS-CoV–specific antibodies by using an indirect
enzyme immunoassay (EIA) kit (Beijing BGI-GBI
Biotech Co., Beijing, China) in accordance with the man-
ufacturer’s instructions. Briefly, diluted serum specimens
were added to SARS-CoV lysate–coated wells and incu-
bated at 37°C for 30 min. The wells were rinsed with a
wash solution and incubated with a conjugated antibody
solution at 37°C for 30 min. After the washing, a substrate
solution was added to wells and incubated at 37°C for 10
min in the dark. Termination solution was added and the
optical density (OD) measured using 450 nm with a refer-
ence wavelength at 630 nm. For every assay, one blank
control, one positive control, and two negative control
wells were included. The cutoff value for a positive test
was defined as 0.13 plus the mean OD of negative control
wells. Specimens were considered positive for SARS-CoV
antibodies if the calculated value (observed OD readings
minus OD reading of the blank control) exceeded the cut-
off value. 
Laboratory D performed serologic testing for SARS
with an in-house indirect EIA (2). Briefly, serially diluted
serum specimens were added to 96-well microtiter plates
(Dynatech Laboratories, Inc., Chantilly, VA) precoated
with either γ-irradiated SARS-CoV lysate (Urbani strain)
or Vero E6 cell lysate and incubated at 37°C for 1 h. After
being rinsed with PBS-Tween-20, plates were incubated
with goat anti-human immunoglobulin (Ig) G, IgA, and
IgM conjugated to horseradish peroxidase (Kirkegaard and
Perry Laboratories, Inc., Gaithersburg, MD) at 37°C for 1
h. After washing, 2,2-azo-bis(3-ethylbenzthiazolin sulfon-
ic acid) (ABTS) substrate (Kirkegaard and Perry
Laboratories, Inc.) was added for 30 min at 37°C. ODs
were measured at 410 nm and 490 nm wavelength.
Specimens were considered positive for SARS-CoV
antibodies if the adjusted sum OD (sum of differences
between SARS-CoV antigen and control antigen wells) for
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titer of the specimen was >1:400. The titer for a specimen
was taken as the highest dilution that had a positive adjust-
ed OD value >0.21.
SARS-CoV Immunofluorescence Assay
Laboratory A performed an in-house immunofluores-
cence assay (IFA). Briefly, SARS-CoV (strain F69)–infect-
ed Vero E6 cells spotted and acetone-fixed on glass slides
were prepared in advance of testing. Serum samples with a
starting dilution of 1:25 were deposited onto the slides and
incubated for 30 min at 37°C. The slides were then rinsed
and blot-dried, and a fluorescein-labeled polyvalent anti-
human immunoglobulin (Biosource International,
Camarillo, CA) was added and incubated for 30 min at
37°C. The slides were then rinsed twice, mounted with
phosphate-buffered glycerol and coverslip, and examined
with a UV microscope. The immunofluorescence titer was
taken as the highest dilution that showed a positive reaction
(apple green fluorescent cytoplasmic granules). Laboratory
C performed a similar IFA but modified it to use SARS-
CoV (strain 6109)–infected FRhK4 cells.
229E/OC43 Microneutralization Assay
A microneutralization assay for human coronaviruses
229E and OC43 was developed for this study by laborato-
ry D. Rhabdomyosarcoma (RD) cells were grown to
80%–90% confluence in Dulbecco’s Modified Eagle’s
medium (DMEM) (GIBCO-Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA)
containing 10% defined fetal bovine serum (FBS)
(HyClone, Logan, UT). 229E (ATCC VR-740) and OC43
(ATCC VR-759) were introduced onto the washed mono-
layers, and cultures were incubated at 33°C with 6% CO2
for 5 days. The infected cultures were submitted to three
freeze-and-thaw cycles, clarified by low-speed centrifuga-
tion, and stored at –70°C. Virus stocks were titrated by
adding 50 µLof 10-fold dilutions (eight replicates per dilu-
tion) of 229E and OC43 to 96-well culture plates (Costar,
Cambridge, MA), followed by adding 50 µLof 2 x 105 RD
cells/mL and incubating at 33°C for 5 days. Infected wells
were identified by an immunofluorescence assay as
described elsewhere (13) by using monoclonal antibodies
specific to 229E or OC43 nucleoprotein. The 50% tissue-
culture infective dose (TCID50) was determined by the
method of Reed and Muench (14). For the microneutral-
ization assay, 50 µL of heat-inactivated human and animal
control hyperimmune serum samples were serially twofold
diluted in 10% FBS-DMEM in triplicate wells. Each sam-
ple was diluted in duplicate 96-well tissue culture plates
followed by adding 100 TCID50 of 229E or OC43. After 1
h incubation, 50 µLof 2 x 105 RD cells/mLwas added, and
plates were incubated at 33°C in 6% CO2 for 5 days. A
back titration was included in each test. Neutralization
titers were defined as the reciprocal of the highest serum
dilution that completely inhibited fluorescence in at least
two of the three triplicate wells. 
OC43 Immunofluorescence Assay
Laboratory C performed an in-house IFA, as described
above for SARS-CoV, but it was modified to use OC43-
infected BSC-1 cells.
OC43/229E Enzyme Immunoassay
Laboratory D performed serologic testing for human
coronaviruses by using an in-house indirect EIA. Briefly,
96-well microtiter plates (Dynatech Laboratories) were
coated overnight at 4°C with previously optimized con-
centrations of clarified lysates of OC43 and 229E and
uninfected RD cells as prepared for the microneutraliza-
tion assay above. Serially diluted serum specimens (1:100
through 1:3,200) were added and incubated for 1.5 h at
37°C. After being washed with PBS-Tween-20, the plates
were incubated at 37°C for 1 h with goat anti-human IgG
conjugated with horseradish peroxidase (Sigma, St. Louis,
MO). After similar washing, a tetra-methyl benzidine sub-
strate (Zymed Laboratories, San Francisco, CA) was
added and incubated for 15 min at room temperature. The
colorometric reaction was stopped with 2 mol/L phosphor-
ic acid, and ODs were measured in dual wavelength mode
at 450 nm and 650 nm. The adjusted sum OD of duplicate
wells of the positive and negative antigen was determined
for each serum dilution, and the highest dilution showing a
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A titer rise of more than fourfold between early and late
serum pairs was considered evidence of recent infection
with OC43 or 229E.
Molecular Studies
SARS-CoV Real-time RT-PCR
Respiratory specimens and stool were tested for SARS-
CoV RNA by using real-time reverse transcription–poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays from several
different sources. Laboratories A, B, and C used assays
developed by Piji Bioengineering (Shenzhen, China) and
Artus GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) following the manu-
facturers’instructions. Laboratory D used an in-house real-
time RT-PCR procedure (15). Appropriate RT-PCR
controls, including positive SARS RNA and negative
extraction (water blank), and amplification controls were
included in each run. In addition, laboratory D tested each
specimen for human RNAse P to ensure the adequacy of
RNA extraction and to monitor for RT-PCR inhibitors. 
OC43/229E RT-PCR
RT-PCR for human OC43 and human 229E was per-
formed on throat swabs by the degenerated consensus PCR
primers for the genus Coronavirus by using the
SuperScript One Step RT-PCR kit (Invitrogen). These
primers were derived from a highly conserved region in
open reading frame (ORF) 1b of the pol gene. Viral total
nucleic acid was processed from throat swabs, and RT-
PCR was carried out by using the method previously
described (15). 
SARS-CoV Sequencing
Sequences from the 3′ third of the SARS-CoV genome
were obtained from overlapping RT-PCR products that
covered the envelope (E), membrane (M), and nucleocap-
sid (N) structural protein genes, plus several other gaps of
unknown function, such as S-E gap between S ORF and E
ORF and M-N gap between S ORF and E ORF, by using a
previously described method (16). 
Culture
Virus isolation was attempted on RT-PCR–positive res-
piratory specimens collected from patients 1 and 2 by
methods previously described (2). Briefly, 100 µLo f
antibiotic-treated specimen was introduced into tube cul-
tures of Vero E6 cells and incubated at room temperature
for 1 h. Fresh modified DMEM with 2% fetal calf serum
was added, and cultures were incubated at 37°C with rock-
ing. Cultures were observed daily for cytopathic effect for
2 weeks then blind passaged. Negative cultures for SARS-
CoV were confirmed by RT-PCR as described.
Results
Serologic Testing
All but one of the serum specimens from these patients
tested positive for SARS-CoV antibodies by all laborato-
ries using multiple assay formats, including EIA, IFA, and
neutralization assay (Table 2). All four patients had
detectable SARS-CoV antibodies by one or more laborato-
ries very early in the illness; serum specimens collected 6
days after onset from patients 1 and 2 were positive by all
laboratories by one or more methods, and specimens col-
lected at 8 days from patients 3 and 4 were positive by EIA
performed at laboratories A and B, respectively. Where
comparisons could be made, the pattern of antibody
responses were similar for all assays, and a fourfold or
greater rise in EIA or IFA antibodies was demonstrable in
multiple laboratories in three of the four patients. A four-
fold rise in SARS-CoV antibodies in patient 3 was identi-
fied by only one laboratory (laboratory A) by IFA;
laboratory Awas the only laboratory that tested the earliest
specimen from patient 3 and tested the serum specimens as
they arrived and not concurrently. 
A concurrent rise in OC43 antibodies was detected by
IFA (laboratory C) in patient 4. To assess the possibility of
OC43-induced SARS antibodies reacting with SARS-CoV
and confounding the diagnosis of SARS, early and late
serum specimens from all patients were simultaneously
tested by laboratory D for SARS-CoV, OC43, and 229E
antibodies by neutralization assay and EIA (Table 3). In
these tests, no rises in either EIA or neutralizing antibody
titers were noted to OC43 or 229E. The serum pair from
patient 1 had a rise in SARS neutralizing antibodies, and
the serum pair from patient 2 had a rise in SARS EIAanti-
bodies (Tables 2 and 3). The earliest acute-phase serum
specimens for patients 2–4 were unavailable for these
tests. Neutralizing antibody titers were not detected to
229E and were detected at a lower titer to OC43 than to
SARS-CoV; previous studies have shown a lack of SARS-
CoV antibodies in paired serum specimens from patients
with acute 229E and OC43 infections (2). 
Virus Detection
A variety of specimens were tested for SARS-CoV by
culture isolation and for SARS-CoV RNA by multiple
real-time RT-PCR assays (Table 4). Although virus was not
successfully isolated from any of the respiratory speci-
mens, viral RNA was detected by RT-PCR in several res-
piratory specimens from patients 1 and 2 by two or more
laboratories and by one laboratory from a single stool
specimen from patient 4. In contrast, all respiratory speci-
mens were negative for other coronaviruses by RT-PCR.
The RT-PCR–positive throat swabs were collected on days
6, 8, and 10 for patient 1 and on days 6 and 8 for patient 2.
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shown by threshold cycle values >35 with the real-time
RT-PCR assays and inconsistent positivity between labora-
tories for all but the day 6 throat swab from patient 1. None
of the other types of specimens, including multiple stool or
stool swab specimens on three of the patients, tested posi-
tive for SARS-CoV RNA. Only the throat swab collected
on day 6 from patient 1 had sufficient viral RNA for the
initial sequencing studies. Sequences were confirmed to be
SARS-CoV and most closely matched isolates from civet
cats taken in November and December from wild animal
markets in Guangdong Province (17). A more extensive
description of these sequences will be presented in a fol-
low-up report.
Discussion
The participation of multiple laboratories in this study
documented SARS-CoV infection in these patients and
permitted comparisons of results obtained with different
assays. Antibody testing provided a relatively early indica-
tion of SARS-CoV infection in all four patients, as early as
6 days but no later than 9 days after onset of illness. SARS-
CoV antibodies have been reportedly detected as early as
6 days after onset, but they are more commonly detected
after 10 to 14 days (2,4,18). Although this early appear-
ance of antibody is consistent with antibody response seen
during the 2003 SARS outbreak, it could also indicate dif-
ferences from that outbreak. For example, these patients
may have had a longer incubation period or may have been
previously infected with a SARS-like coronavirus that
primed their immune systems for a rapid anamnestic anti-
body response. A longer incubation period, possibly
because of low virus inoculum or infection with a virus
that replicated less efficiently, could have provided addi-
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apparent rapid antibody induction. 
SARS-CoV was not isolated from any patient, and
viral RNA was detected in only 3 of 4 patients at relative-
ly low levels. This finding is consistent with results from
studies during the 2003 outbreak that suggested high virus
titers are associated with more severe illness and more
efficient virus transmission (19,20). All of the patients
survived, and none showed evidence of transmission to
others. Only one stool specimen from one of these
patients (patient 4), collected during week 2 of illness,
was positive for SARS-CoV RNA. This finding contrasts
with reports from the 2003 outbreak that a high percent-
age of stool specimens collected during week 2 of illness
were positive for SARS-CoV by RT-PCR and that stool
specimens were more likely to be positive than other spec-
imens during week 2 of illness (4). The low virus titer
found in these patients may reflect infection acquired
directly from animals, before the virus acquired genetic
changes that facilitate infection in humans. Sequence data
recently reported by the Chinese SARS Molecular
Epidemiology Consortium (21) suggest that SARS-CoV
may have adapted to humans during the 2003 outbreak.
Authors noted that the S protein gene had a higher ratio of
coding to noncoding changes in the early stages of the
outbreak, compared with later stages. This finding sug-
gests a selective advantage for these coding changes (pre-
sumably related to infection in humans) and is consistent
with findings from other coronaviruses that amino acid
changes in the S protein can affect tissue tropism and dis-
ease associated with infection (22).
A previously unrecognized concern is the potential for
serologic cross-reactions between human coronaviruses
OC43 and 229E and the SARS-CoV. During the course of
the workup of these patients, one laboratory showed an
antibody response to both SARS-CoV and OC43 in one
patient. This reaction was unexpected and required further
testing to definitively determine which virus induced the
antibody response. Subsequent neutralization and EIA
antibody results demonstrate that SARS-CoV, not OC43-
or 229E-like coronaviruses, induced the antibodies detect-
ed. The weight of the evidence therefore suggests that
these patients were infected with SARS-CoV and not
OC43- or 229E-like coronaviruses. This finding reinforces
the need to better understand mechanisms underlying
apparent cross-reactions between SARS-CoV and other
human coronaviruses with nonneutralization serologic
assays.
These cases illustrate the diagnostic difficulties that can
occur in evaluating patients for SARS. The ability to confi-
dently confirm or negate a diagnosis allows control efforts
to focus on the most important cases and minimizes unnec-
essary social and economic disruption. The cost of missing
a case can be high if further spread occurs, and the cost of
false-positive diagnosis to the patient, family members,
healthcare facility, and community can also be substantial. 
In response, WHO established the SARS Reference and
Verification Laboratory Network, which verifies all sus-
pected cases of SARS-CoV infection outside the country
in which the cases occur (11). WHO and other groups have
also begun to provide test samples and proficiency panels
that allow laboratories to assess their assays’ performance
and guidelines for specimen management to minimize the
chance of contamination. The rapid identification and con-
firmation of SARS-CoV infection in these four cases
exemplify the successful collaboration between local and
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of continued cooperation in the event of the appearance of
new SARS cases. 
Dr. Liang is a professor and virologist specializing in
arboviruses with a focus on Japanese encephalitis and alphavirus
research.
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